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Alemayehu Geda1
For Africa, it is not yet clear if globalisation, deﬁ  ned as increased openness to trade and ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows, will 
improve social development and equity or lead to rising inequality and poverty on the continent. Th  is  paper 
contributes to this discourse by exploring the relationships between openness, poverty and inequality in 
Africa. Th   e analysis begins with a review of social development over the last two decades of the twentieth 
century and details the progress various African countries and regions have made toward attaining a spec-
trum of policy goals. Th   is section is followed by a discussion of openness and a lengthy exploration of the 
patterns of trade and ﬁ  nance, since these are the main channels linking Africa to the rest of the world. Th  e 
macroeconomic policy framework that guided African policymaking over the last three decades is the lens 
through which poverty and inequality are further examined. Th   e paper highlights the major factors under-
pinning openness and social development, and concludes with policy recommendations that may help abate 
destitution and inequity.
Social progress in Africa in the 1990s2
Improving health, education, employment, and equality have been long-term, as well as recent United Na-
tions Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for Africa. Over the past few decades, the lessons learned, 
statistics, and data that have accrued now inform the debate on social development policy.
Comparative data from the 1990s show that human development is highly correlated with the status 
of and access to education and healthcare (see Table 1). Table 1 also conﬁ  rms a decline in illiteracy rates by 
nearly half since 1990. Gender disparity however, remained largely unchanged. Encouraging results were also 
recorded for gross enrolment ratios and infant mortality rates, in which North Africa, followed by Eastern 
and then Southern Africa, showed relatively improved performance.
Except for Botswana, Mauritius and Seychelles, poverty appears pervasive in the Eastern and South-
ern African sub-regions (ESA), where an estimated 50 per cent live below the poverty line. In the Central 
and West African (CWA) sub-region, the dire economic situation severely aﬀ  ects the most disadvantaged 
segments of society, particularly in rural areas. Poverty incidence is lower in North Africa (NA), where ap-
proximately 22 per cent of the population live below the poverty line.
Th   ough most African nations deplored the negative impact of structural adjustment programs on 
the poor, these countries appear to have accepted structural reforms as necessary for and indispensable to 
sustainable growth. Such reforms were meant to incorporate poverty reduction strategies as a central element 
of a long-term economic development vision. Th   is was to be accomplished by allocating resources to sectors 
that would have the greatest impact on poverty reduction. A number of countries increased their budget-
1  I would like to thank two graduate students of the Department of Economics, Addis Ababa University, Dawit 
Berhanu and Melesse Menale, for excellent research assistance, and my friend Abebe Shimeless for excellent input and 
comments. Any remaining errors are mine.
2 Th   is section is based on Alemayehu (2000).2  DESA Working Paper No. 25
ary allocations to the education and health sectors, and accordingly, have reported tangible progress. For 
instance, gross enrolment rates at the primary level have increased while gender gaps somewhat narrowed 
(see Table 1). Other countries moved forward by focusing on the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the mitigation 
of high maternal mortality rates and the major childhood diseases responsible for high infant and under-ﬁ  ve 
(U5MR) mortality rates (see Table 1). Some countries have achieved almost universal access to basic health 
services. Finally, all countries in the sub-regions have taken steps to bolster employment, especially for vul-
nerable groups, though unemployment rates in urban areas remain disproportionately high.
In addition, good governance has also been identiﬁ  ed as a pre-requisite for socio-political and eco-
nomic development. Almost all countries have reported signiﬁ  cant improvements in governance structures 
and modalities in working towards peace, stability and security. Th   is is complemented by forums such as 
NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development), which addresses governance through various means, 
including a peer-review mechanism among African leaders.
Given the pervasiveness of poverty and social under-development in Africa, these improvements are 
inadequate. It is therefore relevant to ask whether there are special features speciﬁ  c to Africa that can help 
explain the massive poverty and inequality that engulf the continent. Some of the elements that may help 
explicate Africa’s severe under-development include; (1) weak initial conditions (such as ailing institutions 
Table 1.
Progress on social development in Africa in the 1990s: Selected indicators
1990 1995 1997 1998 2000 2001
 Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Illiterates as share of 15+ population by gender (per cent)
Eastern & 
Southern Africa 55.3 35.8 49.2 31.3 46.7 29.7 45.5 28.9 43 27.2 41.8 26.5
North Africa 65.1 38.8 58.9 34.3 56.4 32.6 55.2 31.8 52.8 30.2 51.6 29.5
West Africa 67.2 46.4 59.7 40.3 56.7 37.9 55.1 36.7 52.1 34.4 50.6 33.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 60 40 53.4 34.9 50.7 33 49.3 32 46.7 30.1 45.4 29.3
All Africa 61 39.8 54.5 34.8 51.9 32.9 50.5 32 47.9 30.1 46.6 29.3
Gross Enrolment Ratio (per cent)
Eastern & 
Southern Africa 73.9 78.6 74.6 79.9 74.1 79.5 82.5 87.8 88.9 94.3
North Africa 91.4 99.8 99.9 106.9 100.9 107.7 101.9 107.0 102.5 107.3
West Africa 75.3 86.6 77.2 86.5 72.9 81.3 ....
Sub-Saharan Africa 74.4 81.8 75.7 82.6 73.6 80.2 79.2 85.5 . .
All Africa 77.6 85.1 80.0 86.9 78.5 85.1 84.2 90.1 89.3 95.3
Infant Mortality (per 1000 live births)
1990 1995 1997 2000
Eastern & 
Southern Africa 105.9 98.5 94.8 92.0
North Africa 59.4 48.4 43.6 39.4
West Africa 97.6 91.8 89.3 90.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 102.5 95.8 92.6 91.2
All Africa 96.7 90.0 86.8 85.3
Source: Computations based on World Bank (2003a).Openness, Inequality and Poverty in Africa  3
and human capital, and an extractive and lingering colonial history) at the time of independence; (2) the 
dependence of almost all African countries on primary commodity production and trade; (3) the lack of 
non-aid ﬁ  nancial capital and the alarming level of aid-dependency; (4) the lack of ownership of policies that 
are invariably imposed on Africa by donors; and (5) the prevalence of conﬂ  ict and poor governance. Th  e  rest 
of this study is devoted to an in-depth examination of these issues in the context of globalisation.
Recent patterns of openness, inequality and poverty in Africa
Recent literature has emphasized the theory that trade policy strongly impacts growth. Dollar (1992), Ben-
David (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Frankel and Romer (1999), using diﬀ  erent measures of open-
ness, noted that openness is signiﬁ  cantly and positively associated with economic growth. Th   is assertion how-
ever, is not without its critics (see below, for instance, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000). Dixit (1988) and Calvo 
(1987, 1988) have also contested the conclusions of the afro-mentioned studies (Collier and Gunning, 1996).
Rodrik’s various works questioned the uncritical acceptance of the importance of openness (see Ro-
drik, 1992, 1999, 2001). He debated whether the measures of openness used in the inﬂ  uential articles cited 
above focused solely on trade policy issues. In Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), the authors made it abundantly 
clear that the openness measures used in much of the empirical literature did not really select trade policy 
indicators as such. Th   erefore, the ﬁ  nding that openness matters for growth could be spurious.
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), after critically examining the main ﬁ  nding of these inﬂ  uential pro-
openness studies, noted that this literature is largely uninformative regarding the question of “do countries 
with lower policy-induced barriers to international trade grow faster once other relevant country character-
istics are controlled for?” Th   ey noted that there is a signiﬁ  cant gap between the message that the consumers 
of this literature (including multilateral institutions) have derived from it and the ‘facts’ that the literature 
actually demonstrates. Th   is gap emerged from; (1) the researchers use of ‘openness’ indicators that serve as 
poor measures of trade barriers or are highly correlated with other sources of bad economic performance; 
and (2) the methods or empirical strategies used to ascertain the link between trade policy and growth; these 
methods have serious shortcomings, and their removal results in signiﬁ  cantly weaker ﬁ  ndings.
Th   e main point made by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) is that some of the commonly used openness 
indicators serve as a proxy for a wide range of policy and institutional diﬀ  erences, and they can give biased 
results that do not properly evaluate the eﬀ  ect of trade policies on growth. Th   e authors however, were in no 
way suggesting pursuing trade restrictions. Th   ey underscored that, “what we would like the readers to take 
away from this paper is some caution and humility in interpreting the existing cross-national evidence on the 
relationship between trade policy and economic growth” (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000: 62). For instance, in 
the case of sub-Saharan Africa, as noted in Rodrik (1998), there is little concern that Africa’s diﬀ  erent condi-
tions such as poor infrastructure, geography or dependence on few commodities, make it a special case where 
exports do not respond to liberalization policies. However, he argues, the eﬀ  ect of trade policy on economic 
growth seem to be indirect and much more modest. Th   is is because the fundamentals for long-term growth, 
including human resources, physical infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and the rule of law, are rela-
tively underdeveloped on the continent (Rodrik, 1998).
Th   ese studies draw attention to the diﬃ   culty of deﬁ  ning openness with reasonable indicators (see 
Fosu, 2000 for a discussion). Various measures are used, including exchange rate overvaluation, relative price 
distortions, tariﬀ  s and quotas, share of trade in gross domestic product (GDP), and the parallel market pre-4  DESA Working Paper No. 25
miums rate. According to Fosu’s survey, the most comprehensive measure of openness appears to be the one 
used by Sachs and Warner (1995).3
Although data limits us from computing a comprehensive measure of openness for Africa, the data 
given in Table 2 and Figure 1 are instructive. Table 2 shows that exports and imports account for about 60 
per cent of Africa’s GDP (equally divided between exports and imports). Africa’s ﬁ  nancial integration in the 
world economy is limited, as can be ascertained from the share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in GDP, 
which is about one per cent in the last decade. Th   e share of aid however, (and hence debt creating ﬂ  ows) in 
the total budget of most African countries is signiﬁ  cant (see below). Since the share of government subsidies 
in total public spending amounts to only 3.5 per cent on average, we could infer that Africa is generally non-
interventionist. Similarly, the share of tax revenue on international trade is approximately 12 per cent of total 
government revenue (see Table 2). Overall, Figure 1 oﬀ  ers an elaborated version of the openness indicator, 
3  For Sachs and Warner, an economy is deemed open if (1) average tariﬀ   rates are below 40 per cent; (2) average quota 
and licensing coverage of import is less than 40 per cent; (3) a parallel market exchange rate premium is less than 
20 per cent; (4) no extreme controls (taxes, quotas, state monopolies) on exports exist; and (5) the country is not 
considered a socialist country (See Fosu, 2000: 3-4).
Table 2.
Some indicators of openness in Africa (1990-2001 average)
Region (X+M)/GDP X/GDP FDI/GDP Subs/Expr. TaxInt’l/Revenue
Eastern & Southern Africa 52.9 25.8 0.6 1.3 9.3
North Africa 60.9 31.7 1.1 6.8 12.1
West Africa 69.8 34.8 1.9 2.5 19.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 57.8 28.5 1.0 1.6 12.2
All Africa 58.1 29.0 1.0 3.5 12.2
Source:  Author’s computations based on World Bank (2003a).
Key:  X + M:   Exports (and Imports) of good and non-factor services.
  Subs:  Subsidies by the government.
  Expr:   Total Public Expenditure.
  Tax Int’l: Taxes on International Trade (i.e. on Imports & Exports).
  GDP:   gross domestic product.
  FDI:  foreign direct investment.
Figure 1:
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Source: Based on World Bank 
(2003a).Openness, Inequality and Poverty in Africa  5
together with the average growth of the economy, for each country during the period 1990-2001. It shows a 
positive correlation between openness and growth (with a correlation coeﬃ   cient of about 0.30).
African Openness: Th   e pattern of trade
Table 3 shows the deceleration of growth in the volume of exports in SSA from about 15 per cent per annum 
in the early days of independence to about 3 per cent today. Th   e current level of growth is far below the aver-
age for other parts of the world. Th   e share of sub-Saharan Africa in total world export values has also steadily 
declined by more than half during the period of 1980 to 2001 (see Table 3).
Th   e structure of African exports is characterized by dependence on primary commodities, which 
makes them vulnerable to global economic shocks. Such commodities are also characterized by low income 
elasticity of demand, volatility, and a secular decline in prices. Th   ey also generally represent sectors where the 
scope for technical progress is limited (see, among others, Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Alemayehu, 2002) 
(see Figures 2 and 3, and Annex 1a).
For many African countries, more than 50 per cent of export earnings derive from only three prin-
cipal primary commodities (see Table 5a, b and Figure 3). For most small mineral exporting countries this 
ﬁ  gure increases to over 80 per cent. SSA as a whole depends on three major commodities for about 70 per 
cent of its total export receipts (see Annex 1b and Figure 3). Only 8 out of 43 countries (Djibouti, Gambia, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Sierra Leon, Sudan, and Swaziland) have a relatively diversiﬁ  ed export structure. 
Such a narrow export base combined with weak domestic capacity results in an export supply response less 
than that of import demand response. In the context of trade liberalization in Africa, the overall result was a 
deterioration in the balance of trade (see UNCTAD, 2004).
In addition, African countries are also highly dependent on a few developed countries as destina-
tions for their exports (see Table 6). For the period 1955-2002, these developed countries received on 
average, 80 per cent of Africa’s exports. Th   is trend, however, has been declining over the last four decades. 
Europe stands out as the dominant trading partner, with an average share of about 60 per cent. Although 
the share of African trade in the world is limited, what happens globally, and in particular in the developed 
countries, has an enormous impact on Africa (see Alemayehu, 2002).
Table 3. 
Growth of export volumes by region, 1965-2002
Region 1965-1973 1973-1980 1980-1986 1993-2002
Industrial Countries 9.4 5.4 3.5 6.2
Developing Countries 4.9 4.9 4.4 7.1
Sub-Saharan Africa* 15.0 0.1 -1.9 3.1
Source: Based on World Bank (1987) for the period 1980-1986 and World Bank (2003c) for the period of 1993-2002.
* Figures for 1993-2002 include South Africa.
Table 4.
Share of African exports in world exports, 1970-2001
Regions 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001
Developing Countries 22.9 27.5 30.1 25.1 19.7 19.9 23.0 23.5
SSA/World exports 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8
SSA/Developing Countries’ Exports 8.6 7.4 7.4 6.2 5.2 3.8 3.6 3.5
Source: Based on World Bank (2003d).6  DESA Working Paper No. 25
Th   e negative impacts of dependence on primary commodity exports are reﬂ  ected in three inter-
dependent phenomena: a decline in terms of trade, instability of export earnings, and an absolute decline 
in the levels of demand and supply (see Tables 5a and 5b). Table 5a demonstrates that Africa suﬀ  ers from 
export price instability, while Table 5b details the secular decline in its terms of trade (though there was some 
improvement in recent years). Table 6 shows the concentration of African exports in a few developed coun-
tries, which was 84 per cent in 1955 and 71 per cent in 2000. Th   e data also reveal a shift from the EU to the 
US, which is becoming a more frequent destination for African exports.
Figure 2:
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Table 5a.
Africa: Price instability* and price declines of selected primary commodities
Commodity
Price Instability
1962-1980 1982-1990 1991- 1994 1998-2001 1977-2001
All Non-Fuel Primary Commodities 15.2 8.8 5.0 4.1 11.6
Food 24.4 13.5 3.7 7.2 15.7
Tropical Beverages 25.5 14.1 20.6 5.1 20.8
Cocoa 27.7 15.1 10.2 15.8 18.6
Coffee 28.4 16.8 29.8 8.0 26.0
Agric Raw Materials 16.6 5.7 4.6 4.4 11.7
Minerals, Ores, Metals 12.3 13.0 6.9 5.8 14.0
Commodity
Growth in 1980 constant dollar prices,  unless otherwise stated
1962- 1980 1982-1990 1991-1994 1998-2001* 1977-2001**
All Non-Fuel Primary Commodities 1.1 -3.1 2.9 -2.1 -2.8
Food 1.0 -2.5 2.6 -0.1 -2.6
Tropical Beverages 2.9 -11.0 15.0 -17.5 -5.6
Cocoa 5.7 -11.7 5.9 -12.6 -6.9
Coffee 2.9 -10.3 17.1 -21.6 -5.1
Agric Raw Materials 0.5 -1.9 2.3 -0.7 -2.0
Minerals, Ores, Metals -0.5 0.3 -3.1 3.4 -1.9
Source: UNCTAD (2002a); UNCTAD (2002b); UNCTAD (various issues), Commodity Yearbook.
* Th   e measure of price instability is:
where, Y(t) is the observed magnitude of the variable,       is the magnitude estimated by ﬁ  tting an exponential trend to the 
observed value, and n- is the number of observations (UNCTAD, 2002a).
**  In 1985 constant dollar prices.
Table 5b.
Africa: Deterioration in terms of trade, 1990-2001
Terms of trade index, 1995=100
East and 
Southern Africa North Africa West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa All Africa
1990 101.1 104.4 122.1 108.3 106.9
1991 98.4 114.3 114.4 104.1 107.5
1992 96.1 108.9 106.2 99.6 102.7
1993 95.7 102.2 100.2 97.3 99.0
1994 98.4 98.1 98.6 98.5 98.4
1995 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1996 100.2 103.6 120.8 106.9 105.7
1997 96.5 103.3 109.6 101.0 101.6
1998 92.4 93.5 91.4 92.2 92.4
1999 94.4 97.3 101.5 96.9 96.8
2000 102.5 115.5 133.5 112.4 113.3
2001 99.5 115.7 125.7 107.8 110.4
Average 98.0 104.7 110.3 102.1 102.9
Source: Computations based on World Bank (2003a).
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African Openness: Th   e pattern of international ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows
FDI, other private capital ﬂ  ows, and capital ﬂ  ight
Africa’s share of world FDI is extremely low. In general, by the second half of the 1990s, the average share of 
FDI in GDP was not only very small but also declining. Any positive trends were largely related to invest-
ment in countries with newly discovered resources. For instance in 1996, FDI was a mere US$5.5 billion, 
representing only 1.5 per cent of global investment ﬂ  ows. Its distribution was also extremely skewed, with 
Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire accounting for 
over 67 per cent of FDI receipts to Africa. Between 1991 and 1996 ten countries (Nigeria, Morocco, Tuni-
sia, Angola, South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, Namibia, Uganda and Zambia) received almost 90 per cent of 
ﬂ  ows, with Nigeria alone absorbing a third. Th   e majority of ﬂ  ows emanated from France, UK, Germany, and 
the US. Favoured recipient sectors included oil, gas, metals and other extractive industries (ADB, 1998).
Recently, however, there has been a surge of FDI to some countries (Kasekende, Kitabire and Mar-
tin, 1996; Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1996; Bhinda and others, 1999). For all of Africa, the share of FDI 
in GDP rose from 0.29 per cent (US$1.3 billion) in 1990 to 0.56 per cent (US$2.7 billion) in 1995 and to 
1.2 per cent (US$6.3 billion) in 1998. Th   e comparable ﬁ  gures for SSA during this period, excluding South 
Africa, were 0.41 per cent (US$0.76 billion), 1.61 per cent (US$2.7 billion) and 2.4 per cent (US$4.8 bil-
lion) respectively.
Relative market size, the existence of mining activity, and the historical pattern of investment 
together determine the ﬂ  ow of FDI to Africa (see Alemayehu, 2002). Bhattacharya, Montiel and Sharma 
(1997) grouped African FDI recipients into three categories; (1) countries that are long-term recipients 
(Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland and Zambia); (2) countries that recorded large increases in the 
1990s (Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigerian 
and Zimbabwe); and (3) countries that have low and/or declining levels of FDI, but with encouraging turn-
around, such as Uganda.
Other private capital ﬂ  ows such as portfolio ﬂ  ows, bank ﬂ  ows and bonds also reﬂ  ect the openness of 
African economies. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, private capital ﬂ  ows (described as FDI, private 
equity ﬂ  ows and private loans, which included bank, bond and other ﬂ  ows) to SSA were about 9 per cent 
of total private ﬂ  ows to developing countries. Th   is declined to 1.6 per cent during the period of 1990-1995. 
Table 6.











1955 70 10 1 3 84 12 4
1960 67 8 1 3 79 13 8
1970 70 7 4 1 82 10 8
1980 49 31 2 1 83 14 3
1990 57 19 1 2 79 17 4
1995 51 18 2 3 74 22 4
2000 43 23 2 3 71 25 4
Average 58.1 16.6 1.9 2.3 78.9 16.1 5
 Source: UNCTAD (various issues), Handbook of International Trade and Development.Openness, Inequality and Poverty in Africa  9
Th   is sharp fall was attributed chieﬂ  y to the rapid deceleration of private loans beginning in the mid-1980s 
(Bhattacharya, Montiel and Sharma, 1997).
Based on a case study of South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, Bhinda and oth-
ers (1999) recently noted, however, that this trend and perception are changing. South Africa has received 
higher ﬂ  ows than all four countries combined (90 per cent of total SSA since 1992) in absolute terms. How-
ever, relative to GDP, the other countries have received levels ranging from 10 to 15 per cent, (except South 
Africa, which received 4 per cent). Th   ese percentages are as high as the fastest growing Southeast Asian and 
Latin American countries (Bhinda and others, 1999).
Portfolio equity ﬂ  ows, though insigniﬁ  cant in magnitude (except in South Africa), are also growing. 
From 1994 to 1997, more than 12 African-oriented funds have been set up with a total of more than US$1 
billion. Th   e operation of these funds is expanding beyond their initial focus on South Africa to Botswana, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Bhattacharya, Montiel and Sharma, 
1997). Recent information shows three important equity funds with SSA exposure; (1) Pan-African funds 
with an exposure of US$692.9 million; (2) South African dedicated funds with an exposure of US$8.057 
billion; and (3) Emerging market global funds with an exposure of US$1.5 to $3.5 billion (4 to 10 per cent 
of world total is in SSA). Total SSA portfolio investment stock rose to US$10.3-12.3 billion around 1995 
(see Bhinda and others, 1999).
Bank ﬂ  ows to Africa are not that important, except in South Africa, and to some degree, in Tanza-
nia. Th   is is partly attributed to lenders’ preferences to change exposure following economic trends such as; 
the rapid increase of foreign exchange holdings in Africa following ﬁ  nancial sector liberalization; domestic 
ﬁ  nancial sector problems like debt overhang and domestic payment arrears; and the perception of high coun-
try risk. Together these factors resulted either in the decline or increasingly very short-term nature of bank 
ﬂ  ows. Whenever such ﬂ  ows are growing, they are invariably associated with foreign banks. Finally, bond 
ﬂ  ows are not only low, but also erratic, a phenomenon partly attributed to the low credit rating of most Afri-
can countries in global ﬁ  nancial markets (see Bhinda and others, 1999).
Empirical studies reveal a variety of factors behind the recent surge in portfolio ﬂ  ows. Equity ﬂ  ows, 
followed by bonds, which in the African context take the form of treasury bills, are noted as the most impor-
tant. Th   ese factors can be grouped into:
Global or push factors; the trend in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries to invest in emerging markets and the problems some of the OECD 
institutional (usually pension) investors faced with low interest rates and a slow down in eco-
nomic activity at home. Such investors ﬁ  nd SSA attractive because its yields have a low correla-
tion with other emerging markets.
Perception of SSA by investors; perceptions are largely determined by investors’ information 
about Africa and range from a very positive ‘ﬁ  nal frontier’ view to a negative bias.
National factors; these include political and macroeconomic stability, good governance, eco-
nomic growth, regional integration, standardized regional structure of banks, developed and 
positively performing stock markets, and the existence of a motivated labour force.
Particularly, with non-equity ﬂ  ows (bonds and treasury bills); the liberalization of economies, 
possibility of holding dollar denominated accounts in local banks and hence the low risk nature 
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markets are important (see also Bhinda and others, 1999: 69-84; Alemayehu, 2002; Taylor and 
Sarno, 1997; Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993, 1996).
Openness also means that Africans now have a choice, legal or illegal, to hold their assets in advanced 
countries--also known as capital ﬂ  ight. Notwithstanding the measurement problems associated with capital 
ﬂ  ight, a study using a rather large data set based on 22 countries from sub-Saharan Africa concluded that the 
continent has the highest incidence, exceeding even the Middle East. Th   irty-nine per cent of private port-
folios were held outside the continent. Were Africa able to attract back this component of private wealth, 
the private capital stock would increase by approximately 64 per cent (Collier, Hoeﬄ   er and Pattillo, 1999). 
Similarly, Ajayi’s (1997) estimate of capital ﬂ  ight from severely indebted low-income countries of sub-Sa-
haran Africa, which stood at US$22 billion, constituted nearly half of the external resource requirement to 
reduce poverty by half estimated by Amoako and Ali (1998) for 1999-2000.
A review of the empirical literature reveals that the high level of capital ﬂ  ight from Africa, despite 
the continent’s capital scarce characteristics, is attributable to overvalued exchange rates, its evaluation by 
international investors as the riskiest continent, and the level of indebtedness of African countries (Collier, 
Hoeﬄ   er and Pattillo, 1999; Hermes and Lensink, 1992). Th   e impact of debt on capital ﬂ  ight is, however, 
contested in Ajayi (1997) and Alemayehu (2002) who found no relationship between the two variables. 
Ajayi (1997) and Collier, Hoeﬄ   er and Pattillo (1999) also pointed to the importance of ‘trade-faking’ (over 
and under invoicing of imports and exports), political instability (including the abuse of power), unfavour-
able macroeconomic environments, and the lack of economic growth as factors triggering capital ﬂ  ight (see 
Ajayi, 1997).
Bilateral and multilateral ﬂ  ows and Africa’s external debt problem
Th   e total external debt of Africa has increased nearly twenty-ﬁ  ve fold from a relatively low level of US$14 
billion in 1971, to more than US$300 billion in 2003. Th   e major component is outstanding long-term debt, 
(bilateral ﬂ  ows followed by multilateral) which is generally obtained on concessional terms. Over time, Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) credits were also increasingly used, along with ‘Structural Adjustment’ and 
‘Enhanced Structural Adjustment’ facilities until they became a large component of debt. Th  e  accumulation 
of arrears from these ﬂ  ows is leading to an amassing of debt and its attendant problems. Th   e latter is aggra-
vated by the capitalization of interest and principal arrears, which constitute nearly a quarter of the external 
debt burden of the continent (Alemayehu, 2003).
Although the share of African debt as a proportion of the total debt of developing countries is low, 
the relative debt burden born by Africa is extremely heavy compared to its capacity, and in particular to its 
exports. If we exclude grants and net FDI from total inﬂ  ows to Africa, net transfers since 1990 have, in fact, 
been negative, with net outﬂ  ows actually rising from Africa to the developed nations. Such ﬂ  ows increased 
from US$3.6 billion in 1985 to nearly US$12.5 billion in 1998. Finally, in the 1990s, nearly 35 per cent of 
grants to Africa went to ‘technical experts’ that usually came from donor countries.
Th   e actual size of indebtedness does not typically represent an economic problem in itself, since such 
debt can usually be mitigated by rescheduling and similar short-term arrangements. However, the size of 
accumulated debt relative to capacity and its subsequent impact on the economy represent a serious dilemma 
for African countries. In this respect, three inter-related implications of the debt issue deserve mention. First, 
servicing of the external debt erodes foreign exchange reserves, which might otherwise be available for the 
purchase of imports. In the past, this led to the ‘import compression problem’, which is when a shortage of Openness, Inequality and Poverty in Africa  1 1
foreign exchange adversely aﬀ  ected levels of public and private sector investment and ultimately, growth and 
poverty reduction (see, for instance, Ndulu, 1986, 1991; Ratso, 1994). Second, the accumulation of a debt 
stock results in a ‘debt overhang’ problem, which tends to undermine the conﬁ  dence of private investors, 
both foreign and domestic. A decline in levels of private investment as a share of GDP from the late 1970s 
onward may be in part, attributed to this factor (see, for instance, Elbadawi, Ndulu and Ndung’u, 1997). 
Finally, debt servicing places enormous ﬁ  scal pressure on many African nations. Th   is may explain, to some 
extent, the high ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits and decline in the share of public investment in GDP since the late 1970s. 
Naturally, a reduction in public investment will tend to have adverse consequences for physical and social 
infrastructure, which are vital for social development. Th   is outcome is signiﬁ  cant given that public sector in-
vestments, in particular in the low income countries of Africa, crowd-in private investment (see Alemayehu, 
2002, 2003).
Th   e performance of African economies, coupled with a mounting debt burden, surely indicates 
that African countries are incapable of simultaneously servicing their debt and attaining a reasonable level 
of economic growth, let alone addressing the issues of poverty alleviation and social development. Th  e  1996 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative is not only besieged by much conditionality, but also 
fails to oﬀ  er a sustainable solution to Africa’s ﬁ  nancial and trade problems (see Alemayehu, 2003).
Has globalisation caused inequality and poverty in Africa?
Trade liberalization and Inequality in Africa
Th   e earlier literature written by Africans took extreme openness as one of the major obstacles hindering de-
velopment.4 ECA (1989) noted that weaknesses in Africa’s productive base, the predominant subsistence and 
exchange nature of the economy, and its openness (to international trade and ﬁ  nance) have all conspired to 
perpetuate the external dependence of the continent. According to this report, the dominance of the external 
sector is a striking feature of the African economy, and one that leaves African countries quite vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks (ECA, 1989). Other Analysts (see Collier and Gunning, 1999), however, argue that “lack 
of openness explains why Africa has grown more slowly than other regions.”
Although global interdependence takes the form of both ﬁ  nance and trade, the focus here is on 
trade liberalization because of Africa’s under-developed ﬁ  nancial sector and its relative isolation (apart from 
aid) from global ﬁ  nancial markets.5 Africa’s trade, though very small from the rest of the world’s point view 
(SSA share in world exports is about 1 per cent), is dominant and vital, from the African perspective. Trade 
share in each country’s GDP averages about 80 per cent. Th   e empirical literature identiﬁ  es various channels 
through which trade liberalization has impacted Africa, including levels and composition of investment, 
household welfare, the distribution of income, and the competitiveness of local ﬁ  rms.
One of the avenues through which trade liberalization can aﬀ  ect growth and poverty is through 
investment. Collier and Gunning (1996) noted that the literature does not unequivocally concur that trade 
liberalization positively aﬀ  ects aggregate investment. Buﬃ   e (1992) argued that if the protected imports sub-
stitutes sector is capital intensive then trade liberalization will reduce the returns on investment. In this view, 
liberalization is tantamount to a reduction of subsidies on capital goods.
4  See Alemayehu (2002: Chapter 1) for a discussion of such studies.
5  See UNCTAD (2004) for a detailed discussion about ‘trade policy in general’ and ‘trade liberalization’ in particular and 
Alemayehu (2002) for both trade and ﬁ  nancial linkage of Africa with the result of the world.12  DESA Working Paper No. 25
Collier and Gunning (1996), based on the case of Uganda, Nigeria, and Tanzania, suggested that 
trade liberalization might result not only in a fall in aggregate investment, but also in changes in its composi-
tion. Dividing investment into equipment (tradable capital) and structure (non-tradable capital), they found 
that in each country, equipment investment fell signiﬁ  cantly both in absolute and relative (to GDP) terms. 
For instance, in Uganda, equipment investment fell by 20 per cent while structures investment rose by 34 
per cent. Th   e authors underscored the need to weigh these opposing changes to analyse the eﬀ  ects of trade 
liberalization on investment and its composition. If the traded sector is characterized by dynamic externali-
ties and learning by doing, as is usually the case, the detrimental eﬀ  ect of liberalization on Africa’s growth 
could be very large. Changes in investment might also be related to the terms of trade. Liberalization in 
Africa has led to specialization in commodity production, which has been characterized by deterioration in 
the terms of trade (see Alemayehu, 2002). Along the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, this volatility in the terms 
of trade brought about capital (and hence, investment) instability in Africa (see Fosu, 1991).
Another area of concern for African countries is the eﬀ  ect of liberalization on household welfare. 
UNCTAD (2004) shows that there is a general tendency for the incidence of extreme poverty to be more 
persistent in commodity dependent countries, such as those in Africa. In least developing countries that 
export minerals, the incidence of $1/day poverty rose on average from 61 to 82 per cent between the period 
1981-1983 to 1997-1999 (UNCTAD, 2004: 131). Haouas and Yagoubi (2003) investigated the response 
of demand elasticities for labour to trade liberalization in Tunisian manufacturing industries. Th  ey  found 
weak empirical support for the claim that trade liberalization leads to an increase in the demand elasticity for 
labour, and they attributed this to the tight labour regulation in Tunisia. Th  is  ﬁ  nding indicates the possibil-
ity of mitigating the detrimental eﬀ  ect of liberalization on welfare, but only at the cost of ﬁ  rm eﬃ   ciency and 
competitiveness.
Another study on Tunisia by Chemingui and Th   abet (2001), using a Computable General Equilibri-
um (CGE) model, found that liberalization, and speciﬁ  cally the reduction of export subsidies in the agricul-
tural sector, decreased average rural household welfare. Th   e study attributed this result to a shift in domestic 
demand from locally produced goods to imported goods, and to a shift in supply from production for local 
markets to production for foreign markets. Th   e elimination of internal support (subsidies) for agricultural 
sectors made agricultural inputs expensive. Th   is rise in price forced suppliers to allocate resources for produc-
tion that used less of the previously subsidized inputs. Th   e authors found that rural households will bear the 
harsher consequences of these changes as both their income and expenditure are negatively aﬀ  ected.
Th   e impacts of trade liberalization on urban households have also been the subject of much debate. 
For instance, Litchﬁ  eld, McCulloch and Winters (2003) found that trade liberalization hurt non-agricultural 
households, while the combination of output and input market reforms dampened the eﬀ  ect on rural farm-
ers. Th   e idea that urban households will be aﬀ  ected, but only through a change in their level of expenditure, 
appears to contradict the study of Bussolo and Lecomte (1999). Th   ey demonstrated that in sub-Saharan 
Africa, a reduction of average tariﬀ  s from 40 per cent to 10 per cent entails a real income loss of 35 per cent 
for urban employers and 41 per cent for recipients of trade rents, compared to a gain of 20 per cent for farm-
ers. Th   e overall net gain for the economy is estimated at 2.5 per cent. As noted by Chemingui and Th  abet 
(2001), the relatively small size of this eﬃ   ciency gain, compared to the redistribution eﬀ  ects, makes trade 
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In a similar vein, Blake, McKay and Morrissey (2000) concluded that trade liberalization has modest 
positive welfare eﬀ  ects.6 Th   ey noted that the welfare of agricultural producers has signiﬁ  cantly improved, al-
though the urban self-employed stood to gain more from freer trade. Ingco (1996) using data from a sample 
of developing countries, including those from Africa, noted that trade liberalization in agriculture has invari-
ably led to a terms of trade deterioration. Th   is result can be counteracted however, with reforms that correct 
for domestic distortions. Th   e terms of trade gain and loss is mixed for most African countries in his sample. 
For net beverage exporters, however, Ingco (1996) reported a loss in terms of trade. He also observed that 
welfare losses are associated with the extent of initial trade distortion. Th   e larger this distortion, the greater 
the welfare loss will be. Given the distortions in many African countries, welfare losses following liberaliza-
tion are likely to be the dominant eﬀ  ect.
A number of negative impacts of trade liberalization on household welfare are documented in the 
review of Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2002). In the case of Zambia, trade liberalization distorted 
domestic marketing arrangements and eventually destroyed markets. For instance, the maize marketing mon-
opsony that beneﬁ  ted rural households by allowing them to purchase large stocks of maize was abolished. 
Th   e loss of the monopsony isolated rural households and signiﬁ  cantly reduced their income (Winters, Mc-
Culloch and McKay, 2002). Deininger, Klaus and Olinto (2000, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 
2002), using micro-panel data for farm households in Zambia, found that the improvement of agricultural 
productivity following external liberalization was severely constrained by the absence of key productive as-
sets. Related studies cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2002) and Head (1998) showed that female 
workers in South Africa suﬀ  ered a great deal when the EU scaled back its imports of canned fruit. Elson 
and Evers (1997) noted that some studies showed that ﬁ  shermen in Tanzania shared the same fate when the 
EU cut back its imports of ﬁ  sh over the period 1997-1998. Fishermen incomes declined by a sizable 80 per 
cent. Elson and Evers (1997, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) observed that in a response to 
commercialised agriculture, many households in Uganda shifted from the production of food crops to cash 
crops, jeopardizing family health in the process. Th   eir study shows that the adjustments elicited a positive 
supply response, but at the same time, increased demands on female labour time, and this was accompanied 
by increases in child malnutrition.
Th   ere are however, studies that point to gains in household welfare. Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly 
(1998, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) showed that an additional dollar of new farm in-
come raises total household income by $2.88 in Burkina Faso, $1.96 in Niger, $2.48 in the Central Ground-
nut Basin of Senegal and $2.57 in Zambia. Th   ese increases in household incomes, Hazel and Hojjati (1995, 
cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) argue, are due to the high marginal propensities to consume 
out of local non-tradable goods. Furthermore, Löfgren (1999, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 
2002), made the case that reduced agricultural protection in Morocco was bound to have substantial welfare 
gains in aggregate terms. Similarly, Anderson and Yao (2003) demonstrated that the welfare gains accruing to 
SSA region from participating in the World Trade Organization (WTO) rounds are twice as much than from 
not partaking in it.
Using data for 14 countries, Hertel and others (2002) concluded that the impact of trade liberaliza-
tion on diﬀ  erent households can’t be conclusively determined because the eﬀ  ects were fairly varied and not 
always positive. It was also observed that global trade liberalization had the unwelcome eﬀ  ect of raising the 
price of staple foods relative to non-food prices. Since the poor spend a disproportionate share of their in-
6 Th   e estimates are based on the assumption that the commitments of the Uruguay Round are implemented by 2002.14  DESA Working Paper No. 25
come on food, trade liberalization will adversely impact them. Moreover, the impacts on short- run earnings 
are fairly mixed. With agricultural proﬁ  ts rising and non-agricultural proﬁ  ts and wages falling, the overall 
outcome depends on the structure of poverty in each country. Th   ese results are also reproduced in Hertel and 
others (2002).
Th   e loss in terms of welfare for Africa may also come, as noted by Dembele (2001), from the global 
unfairness of trade liberalization. Th   ough most developing countries reduced import tariﬀ  s to less than 20 
per cent and removed non-tariﬀ   barriers altogether, developed countries have not implemented their same 
commitments. Th   is unevenness in liberalization has caused cheap imports (including from newly industrial-
izing Asian countries) to ﬂ  ood sub-Saharan African markets. Th   is has resulted in the destabilization of many 
small scale private and public enterprises, and the subsequent loss of a considerable volume of domestic jobs. 
Th   is trend of de-industrialization, as noted by Dembele (2001), has been accompanied by the repealing of 
minimum wage laws, which, although aimed at helping competitiveness, have severely reduced the bargain-
ing power of employees. Currency devaluations and loss of revenue from import taxes have diminished 
purchasing power, with governments forced to respond to budget deﬁ  cits with new indirect taxes. Th  e  result 
is more pressure on low income families that tend to spend most of their income on consumption, and cut-
backs on important public, especially social, spending.
Tekere (2001) similarly reported that liberalization in Zimbabwe put the country’s economy in 
turmoil, and that growth was better in the years preceding it. According to Lall (1999, cited in Winters, Mc-
Culloch and McKay, 2002), the increased import competition in Africa has substantially reduced industrial 
employment. Rather than upgrading aggressively, ﬁ  rms in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania contracted their ac-
tivity in response to competitive pressure. Lall (1999) noted that ﬁ  rms’ lack of preparedness for competition, 
the absence of policies to promote technological improvement, and the poor technological and infrastructure 
development in the countries were thought to have contributed signiﬁ  cantly to these perverse results. A simi-
lar study by Parker, Riopelle and Steel (1995, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) showed that 
the beneﬁ  ts from import-liberalization accrued mainly to ﬁ  rms that modiﬁ  ed their operations swiftly.
Rodrik (1992) noted that the impetus for liberalization in Latin American and African countries 
primarily arose from the prolonged macro-economic quagmire in which developing countries were immersed 
during the 1980s. Th   e liberalization hence pursued has generally led to ﬁ  ve dollars of income being reshuf-
ﬂ  ed within the economy for every dollar of eﬃ   ciency gain. Th   is huge distributional eﬀ  ect has an enormous 
political implication. Considering three parties, consumers, domestic producers and import license holders, 
he showed that license holders and domestic producers lost portions of income while consumers gained by a 
magnitude that barely exceeded these losses. Th   is left a net eﬃ   ciency gain that amounted to a fraction of the 
losses of the two parties (i.e. the ratio of net gains to redistribution that is involved is very small). Although 
there are studies that support the view that trade reform improves equity, the prospect of too much redis-
tribution may explain the political diﬃ   culty in enacting trade reform. From the perspective of policymak-
ers, the study elaborates that the pure reshuﬄ   ing of income must be counted as a political cost. Th  e  rents 
and revenues that accrue on a regular basis create entitlements, thereby increasing the political diﬃ   culty of 
instituting changes except, perhaps in times of crisis. It is thus instructive and important to appreciate the 
political context of such reform, particularly in Africa where the democratic tradition is generally nascent.
In summary, the existing empirical literature on Africa shows that the impact of trade liberalization 
on household welfare is mixed. In most cases rural households, relative to urban, seem to beneﬁ  t during the 
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and causes large redistributions in income that are politically costly and associated with de-industrialization. 
Which of these eﬀ  ects dominate in a particular country is largely an empirical question. In countries that are 
non-oil primary commodity exporters, trade liberalization is associated with poverty and thought to rein-
force the poverty trap. In general, UNCTAD (2004) reported that, the trade-poverty relationship improved 
between the ﬁ  rst and the second half of the 1990s. Using the IMF index that categorizes countries as open, 
moderately open, and restricted, the study found that moderately open countries, followed by the restricted 
ones, made the greatest improvements (UNCTAD, 2004).
Trade Liberalization and Poverty in Africa
Poverty is pervasive in Africa. As Table 7 demonstrates, North Africa has a relatively lower incidence of 
poverty when compared to Southern and East-Africa, which have the highest. Poverty is also found to be 
largely a rural phenomenon, and in most countries, urban is lower than rural destitution by as much as 50 
per cent, suggesting signiﬁ  cant regional disparities in the standards of living. During the 1990s, the number 
of poor living in SSA increased by about 73 million, leading to a one percentage point rise in the incidence 
of poverty (see Table 8). ECA (2003) noted that close to half of the African population lives on less than a 
dollar per day. However, a comparison of two surveys conducted for about 14 countries in the early and late 
1990s shows that there may be a trend towards poverty reduction (see Tables 7 and 9).
Human development indicators remained fundamentally unchanged in the 1990s, though there 
were still a number of cases where poverty showed signiﬁ  cant improvement. Th   ese included Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Lesotho, South Africa, Egypt and Uganda, where absolute poverty no-
ticeably declined (see Tables 8 and 9). Other reports also indicated signiﬁ  cant improvements in the condition 
of the poor in Mozambique and Rwanda. Despite these encouraging signs, poverty in Africa, particularly in 
SSA remains deeply entrenched.
ECA (2003) illustrated the spatial dimension of poverty when it reported that poor households 
tended to be in the most impoverished regions. Th   ese households were also likely to be larger in size, less lit-
erate, and suﬀ  ering from insuﬃ   cient nutrition. ECA also approximated that a quarter of the people in many 
African countries are chronically poor, with up to 60 per cent of the population transitioning in and out 
of poverty. Th  eir  ﬁ  ndings underscored the importance of reducing vulnerability as an anti-poverty strategy 
(ECA, 2003).
Th   e economic growth that stems from international trade is one eﬀ  ective means available to Afri-
cans for tackling poverty. It is therefore important to ask whether poverty in Africa is associated with greater 
openness in general, and trade liberalization in particular. Th   e available aggregate data for Africa is presented 
in Figure 4, where openness (measured as exports and imports as the share of GDP) positively associate with 
income inequality. Th   is data indicates that more open economies in Africa tend to have high levels of income 
inequality. Part of the reason for this positive association could be that SSA countries in the middle-income 
category derive a signiﬁ  cant part of their GDP from trade in extractive industries. Th   ese sectors, due to po-
litical economy factors, are characterized by high initial inequality (see also below). Th   e question arises; does 
this mean that more openness can lead to a worsening of income inequality and higher incidence of poverty?
Th   e answer depends on a number of factors. Th   ere are cases where increased trade liberalization 
might be beneﬁ  cial to the poor. According to Winters, McCulloch and Mckay (2004), the net gain to 
household welfare could be positive in circumstances where the majority of the population works in the trad-16  DESA Working Paper No. 25
Table 7.








Rural Urban National Rural Urban National National
West Africa
Senegal 2001 80.0 51.5 53.9 4.19 2.50 5.44 10.09
Mali 1998 75.9 30.1 63.8 7.03 1.13 8.29 13.00
Gambia 1999 73.0 28.0 69.0 0.73 .12.0 0.99 1.43
Niger 1993 66.0 52.0 63.0 6.52 1.08 7.54 11.97
Guinea 1996 52.0 24.0 40.0 3.27 0.52 3.39 8.48
Burkina Faso 1998 51.0 16.5 45.3 5.57 0.34 5.89 13.00
Cote d’Ivoire 1998 42.0 23.0 33.6 3.99 1.64 5.59 16.63
Nigeria 1993 36.4 30.4 34.1 28.11 14.22 42.29 124.01
Ghana 1999 36.0 17.3 27.0 4.83 1.30 5.65 20.92
Benin 2002 33.0 23.2 29.0 1.27 .67 1.95 6.74
Estimate 44.4 29.5 38.1 65.5 23.50 87.00 226.27
Central Africa
Cameroon 2001 49.9 22.1 40.2 4.02 1.76 6.44 16.02
Chad 1996 67.0 63.0 64.0 4.47 1.22 5.50 8.60
Estimate 56.9 29.1 47.6 8.5 3.00 11.90 24.62
North Africa
Mauritania 2000 61.2 25.4 46.3 0.75 0.42 1.34 2.89
Algeria 1995 30.3 14.7 22.6 4.41 2.53 7.19 31.80
Morocco 1999 27.2 12.0 19.0 3.76 2.01 5.81 30.57
Egypt 2000 21.2 10.7 16.7 8.74 3.28 12.01 71.93
Tunisia 1995 13.9 3.6 7.6 0.52 0.21 0.75 9.83
Estimate 24.4 11.7 18.4 18.20 8.50 27.10 147.02
East Africa
Djibouti 1996 86.5 . 45.1 0.09 . 0.32 0.70
Madagascar 2001 74.9 50.0 69.6 9.54 2.62 12.11 17.40
Burundi 2000 68.7 68.2 68.7 4.27 0.42 4.69 6.83
Rwanda 2000 67.9 22.6 64.1 5.90 0.13 5.38 8.39
Kenya 1997 53.0 49.0 52.0 11.82 4.76 16.63 31.99
Tanzania 1991 49.7 24.4 51.1 14.21 2.04 18.90 36.98
Ethiopia 2000 45.0 37.0 44.2 26.87 4.06 31.24 70.68
Estimate 52.8 40.3 51.7 72.70 14.0 89.30 172.97
Southern Africa
Zambia 1998 83.1 56.0 72.9 5.43 2.39 7.88 10.81
Mozambique 1997 71.3 62.0 69.4 9.62 3.33 13.09 18.86
Swaziland 1995 70.6 45.4 65.5 0.57 0.13 0.71 1.08
Malawi 1991 66.5 54.9 54 7.10 0.79 6.54 12.11
Lesotho 1993 53.9 27.8 49.2 0.75 0.11 0.89 1.80
Zimbabwe 1996 48.0 7.9 34.9 4.18 0.33 4.50 12.89
Estimate 66.3 43.9 58.4 27.70 7.10 33.60 57.55
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able sectors, such as in the production of exportable crops or in the formal manufacturing sectors that trade 
internationally. Th   e entire issue is thus country and period speciﬁ  c.
Notwithstanding the complex relationship between growth and poverty, in particular where the 
eﬀ  ect of income distribution is considered, the aggregate available data for Africa in the 1990s shows that 
openness is negatively associated with the incidence of poverty. Th   e relatively developed countries such as 
those in North Africa, South Africa, and Cote d’Ivoire had a high index of openness and a lower incidence of 
poverty (see Figure 5). Botswana, which is an outlier, did not seem to have less poverty even though it main-
tained a higher degree of openness. Th   is case suggests the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the 
two variables. Th   is outcome might be related to inequality which often arises (or increases) in highly open 
countries characterized by dependence in a single commodity; such as diamonds in Botswana.
Table 8.
Status of human development in sub-Saharan Africa
1990 2000
People living on less than US$1 (PPP) a day (% of population) 45 46
Primary completion rate (% of relevant age group) 57 55
Promote gender equality and empower women  79 82
Under ﬁ  ve mortality rate (per 1,000 births) 187 174
Maternal mortality rate (per 1,000,000 live births) 920* 917
Access to an improved water source 54* 58
Access to improved sanitation facilities (% of population) 55* 54
Source: www.developmentgoals.org.
* United Nations Database.
Table 9.
Change in poverty during 1990s (based on $1/day and national poverty lines)
Country P0 ** (survey year) P0 ** (survey year) Annual percentage change
Botswana  33.40  (1986) 23.50 (1993) -4.23
Burkina Faso  61.00  (1994) 44.90 (1998) -6.60
Cameroon  33.40 (1996) 17.10 (2001) -9.76
Ethiopia  31.30 (1995) 26.30 (2000) -3.19
Kenya  26.50 (1992) 23.00 (1997) -2.64
Lesotho  43.11 (1993) 36.00 (1995) -8.25
Madagascar  49.00 (1993) 49.00 (1999) 0.00
Mauritania  28.60 (1995) 25.90 (2000) -1.89
South Africa  11.50 (1993) 7.10  (1995) -19.13
Zambia  63.70 (1993) 63.70 (1998) 0.00
Cote d’Ivoire  12.30 (1995) 15.50 (1998) 6.88
Malawi* 54.00 (1991) 65.00 (1998) 2.40
Egypt* 22.90 (1996) 16.70 (2000) -9.28
Zimbabwe* 25.80 (1991) 34.90 (1996) 5.20
Tunisia* 7.40 (1990) 7.60 (1995) 0.52
Tanzania* 41.60 (1993) 35.70 (2001) -2.06
Uganda* 44.00 (1997) 35.00 (2000) -6.82
Source: World Bank (2003b); World Bank (2000, 2001).
*  National poverty line is used instead of US$1/day.
**  P0= Head count ratio.18  DESA Working Paper No. 25
In another study, Cornia (1999) argues that falling equality in Africa over the past two decades 
cannot be attributed to the traditional causes such as land concentration and unequal access to education, 
but rather to the unregulated liberalization of domestic and international markets. His analysis points out 
that inequality between countries has been, in the past 15–20 years, followed by a surge in inequity within 
countries, including a few African economies. According to Cornia, the main source of the disparity in sub-
Saharan Africa was the urban-rural gap. However, the process of ‘equalization-downwards’, with the impact 
of failed structural adjustment (liberalization) policies on urban income, has bridged that divide. Cornia also 
noted that intra-urban and intra-rural disparities have persisted as a result of policies that promote growth 
and exports in the midst of highly unequal distribution of assets. Given these ﬁ  ndings, it seems that the rela-
tionship of openness, growth and inequality remains undetermined.
Figure 4:
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Inequality, in addition to income, shapes the relationship between openness and poverty. African 
inequality can be evaluated from two perspectives: (1) it can be appraised from a global viewpoint where 
Africa’s position in the world distribution of wealth is considered (see Table 10); (2) the distribution of 
income and wealth can be examined within the African continent, comparing countries or groups within 
countries (see Table 11).
Table 10 shows the striking divergence in the distribution of income across the world, despite ﬁ  fty 
years of rapid globalisation. Th   e table highlights the fact that the poor are growing more destitute while the 
rich are becoming even better oﬀ  . Africa’s per capita income as a percentage of high income OECD countries 
declined from 3.3 per cent in 1980, to 2.1 per cent during 1991-1995. Th   is decline continued to 2.0 per 
cent in the second half of the 1990s and to 1.9 per cent in 2001.
Th   is widening income gap was actually common for most developing countries, except for countries 
in East Asia and the Paciﬁ  c. Moreover, Wade (2003) has shown that Africa’s share of the bottom quintile of 
the world distribution of income increased between 1990 and 1999. Th   e continent of Africa is becoming 
worse oﬀ   after opening its economy to international trade and ﬁ  nance. It is therefore important to examine 
whether openness in Africa, in particular international trade, is associated with persistent and rising inequal-
ity and poverty. Th   is issue is discussed at length in the rest of this section.
Th   e information contained in Table 11 is based on the best available data in Africa, and covers ap-
proximately 60 per cent of the continent’s population (ECA, 1999). It shows that Africa is characterized by 
a high degree of inequality, with a Gini coeﬃ   cient of 44 per cent. Latin America had a Gini coeﬃ   cient of 
49 per cent. Th   e high standard deviation reﬂ  ects the large variation in inequality among countries on the 
Table 10.
Regional per capita income as share of high income
(OECD Countries Per Capita Income – 1995 constant US$, percentage)
Region 1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.3 3.1 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.9
South Asia 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
Middle East & North Africa 9.7 9.0 7.3 7.1 6.8 6.7
Latin America & Caribbean 18.0 16.0 14.2 13.5 13.3 12.8
East Asia & Paciﬁ  c 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.5 3.1 3.3
High income non-OECD 45.3 45.3 48.2 56.1 60.2 59.2
High income 97.7 97.6 97.6 97.9 97.9 97.8
High income OECD 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Computations based on World Bank (2003d)
Table 11.










Gini Coefﬁ  cient 44.4 8.9 58.4 32.0 38.1 31.9 49.3 33.8
Share of Top 20 % 50.6 7.4 63.3 41.1 44.3 39.9 52.9 39.8
Share of Middle Class 34.4 4.3 38.8 38.8 37.5 38.4 33.8 41.8
Share of Bottom 20% 5.2 5.2 8.7 2.1 6.8 8.8 4.5 6.3
Source: ECA (1999).20  DESA Working Paper No. 25
continent. Inequality was especially high in South Africa (58.5 per cent), Kenya (58.3 per cent), Zimbabwe 
(56.8 per cent), Guinea-Bissau (55.8 per cent) and Senegal (54.1 per cent) and lower in Egypt (32 per cent), 
Ghana (34.1 per cent) and Algeria (35.5 per cent). Th   e top 20 per cent of the African population accounted 
for about half of total income; again the second highest among regions in the world, next to Latin America 
(see ECA, 1999).
Given these results, it is instructive to ask whether or not this pattern of inequality is associated with 
openness. Most cross-country regressions have found that openness, deﬁ  ned in diﬀ  erent ways, is positively 
correlated with income inequality (see Fischer, 2000; Easterly, 2002).7 Again, as can be read from Figure 6, 
the correlation between a measure of openness and income inequality is positive and signiﬁ  cant for selected 
African countries. Apart from the theoretical explanations for this evidence (such as the biased demand for 
skilled labour when developing countries liberalize their trade), there is also a political economy side to the 
story. Easterly (2002) argues that resource rich countries that depend primarily on a few products for their 
exports tend to have institutions and political frameworks that favour the persistence of income inequal-
ity. Th   at is, more open economies in Africa tend to depend on one or two major export items (mineral, oil 
or primary commodity), and are characterized by high initial inequality. Such primary inequality could be 
sustained by trade liberalization.
Th   e impact of the initial endowment diﬀ  erential on the distribution of income following liberaliza-
tion is shown in Figure 7. Using population density as a crude indicator of endowment intensity, Figure 7 
shows a negative association between population density (low density showing initial inequality of resource 
ownership) and the Gini coeﬃ   cient for a number of African countries in the 1990s. Th   is outcome suggests 
that countries abundant in natural resources, such as land, tend to experience a rise in income inequality fol-
lowing trade liberalization. Th   e explanation follows that countries rich in natural resources or land are both 
7  Some disagree on the assertion that trade reform worsens income inequality on the grounds that the causation is weak 
(e.g. Srinivasan and Wallack, 2003). Dollar and Kraay (2001) also takes the view that greater openness is neutral with 
respect to income distribution. 
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capital and labour poor--factors represented by inequitable ownership in Africa (see Deininger and Olinto, 
2000). Both Figure 7 and the current cross-country evidence support these linkages between factor endow-
ments and inequality.
Social Development, Equity and Inequality
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and Social Development in Africa
SAPs have been the macroeconomic policy framework informing policy making in Africa since the 1980s. 
SAPs are based on the belief that the African economic and social crisis is primarily explained by policy 
failures that can be redressed with reform (World Bank, 1981, 1989, 1994a). Th   e World Bank argued that 
the macroeconomic management strategies prescribed in SAPs represent the road to economic recovery for 
Africa, which means more, not less, adjustment is required (World Bank, 1994a). Th   is assertion has been the 
subject of a number of criticisms voiced by a diversity of actors in the international policy arena (see, inter 
alia, ECA, 1989; Adam, 1995; Mosley, Subasat and Weeks, 1995; Lall, 1995; White, 1996; Alemayehu, 
2002).
At the 1995 Copenhagen Summit for Social Development, a commitment was made to include 
social development goals in structural adjustment programs, paying particular attention to the eradication 
of poverty, the promotion of full and productive employment, and the enhancement of social integration. 
According to Mkandawire and Soludo (1999), SAPs in Africa have made signiﬁ  cant progress on economic 
fundamentals, but poverty remains widespread and the institutional requirements for sustaining growth and 
extending its beneﬁ  ts more equitably among the population remain onerous (see Mkandawire and Soludo, 
1999; ECA, 1999). Initially, there was an attempt to address the detrimental social impact of SAPs by ad hoc 
measures for the inclusion of ‘social safety nets’. Th   is however, has changed over time and the World Bank 
and IMF have more recently emphasized linking SAPs with poverty reduction through Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Th  is  modiﬁ  cation is being strengthened with support for improved statistical and 
poverty monitoring capacity at the country level as well as with promises to ensure the participation (and 
Figure 7:
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ownership) of local communities and civil society in the design and implementation of poverty reduction 
policies.
Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) noted that when the situation of the SAP implementing countries 
was evaluated in-line with the objective of reducing poverty, poverty in SAP countries was comparable to the 
regional average, if not worse. In six of the thirteen countries for which data is available, more than 50 per 
cent of the population lived on less than one dollar a day. In some countries, like Zambia, the poverty head 
count ratio reached as high as 85 per cent. Poverty was also less severe in countries with no special assistance 
programs (see Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999), pointing to the fact that the implementation of SAPs over 
the last two decades has been unsuccessful in achieving the goal of equitable social development, as outlined 
in the Copenhagen summit.
Th   ere is also greater recognition, in Africa and among its development partners, of the eﬀ  ects of 
structural adjustment on social development and growth. Th   e ECA study cited above shows that social 
stability in the African countries implementing adjustments accounted for a signiﬁ  cant diﬀ  erence in growth 
performance. Five countries with social instability grew at less than half the annual rate of those that main-
tained social stability. Moreover, over the past few years, the sector approach to addressing social develop-
ment equity has evolved. It has been tried in about 25 programs and is replacing the traditional form of aid. 
About half of the identiﬁ  ed programs are in health and education with another nine in roads. Th  is  indicates 
an increasing emphasis on social sectors since the Copenhagen Summit. Unfortunately, poor management 
and slow resource disbursement at the implementation stage characterize most projects. Data for the ﬁ  rst 
year after the Social Summit show that the average public spending in African reforming countries declined 
from 3.5 per cent to 3.2 per cent of GDP (IMF, 1998; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Alemayehu, 2000).
Th   e evaluation of special assistance programs in adjusting African countries is diﬃ   cult due to the 
paucity of data detailing how much public spending actually reaches the poor. Th   is partly reﬂ  ects public 
mismanagement, but also points to the existence of external donors (as well as NGOs) that increasingly fund 
this sector, but whose accounts are not integrated into national databases. In summary, there is an increasing 
emphasis (since the Summit) to focus on social issues such as poverty, social sector promotion, education, 
and health, however, implementation problems are major bottlenecks in realizing these social objectives 
(Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Alemayehu, 2000).
Th   e Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and social development in Africa8
Th   e PRSPs and realization of the MDGs are key elements of current public policy discourse in Africa. Th  e 
PRSPs are essentially extensions of the SAPs and sponsored by the Bretton Woods Institutions. PRSPs 
suggest that there are opportunities to scale up participatory learning strategies from grassroots to national 
levels, while also oﬀ  ering new possibilities to budget for these activities and increase public interest and 
participation in poverty monitoring (UNDP, 2002). One of the problems of earlier strategies is that they 
failed to involve civil society and major stakeholders in policymaking. Instead, development policies were 
often formulated by government technocrats and decision makers, with the inﬂ  uence and help of donors. 
Th   e PRSP initiative created, at least in principle, an opportunity for building a national consensus on the 
critical causes of poverty and social development inequity, as well as how to design appropriate interventions. 
8 Th   is section is largely based on Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) report (memo) on ‘Special Program of Assistance–
Phase Five Towards New Aid Relationships to Reduce Poverty’.Openness, Inequality and Poverty in Africa  2 3
Th   us, if appropriately implemented, the value added of the PRSP initiative may go beyond the economics of 
poverty reduction all the way to improving democratic culture and developing social capital.
In Africa, as elsewhere, participatory poverty data collection and policy work appear to be limited to 
and over-reliant on donor-funded exercises. Critical collaboration between government, civil society, and the 
private sector does not occur, and consultations are not incorporated into the political activity of prioritising 
a range of policy options (UNDP, 2002; Weeks and others, 2003). A recent study that evaluated the PRSP 
and Joint Staﬀ   Assessment documents of the World Bank for 19 African countries noted encouraging signs 
of progress towards comprehensive and participatory planning based on the recognition that poverty is mul-
tidimensional and has many roots. At the same time however, there is a tendency to ignore the social dimen-
sions of anti-poverty strategies. Th   e authors therefore concluded that there is scope for further international 
dialogue on the realistic expectations of PRSPs in terms of data, analytical rigour, and strategic detail. Th  ere 
is also room for technical guidance in the preparation of PRSPs with the aim of incorporating social develop-
ment goals (Th   in, Underwood and Gilling, 2001).
MDGs are the centre of oﬃ   cial social discourse in Africa. It is hoped that these eight broad goals 
will be used as “a tool for awareness raising, advocacy, alliance building, and renewal of political commit-
ments at the country level, as well as to build national capacity for monitoring and reporting on goals and 
targets” (Weeks and others, 2003). Th   e recent impetus for MDGs in Africa can be linked to the Copenhagen 
and the Millennium Declarations. Current studies about the MDGs generally cover the issue of achievability 
and resource requirements. On the other hand, key government policy documents in many parts of Africa 
use the MDG targets as desirable benchmarks even though the MDGs are not yet a coherent and central 
part of policy plans. Th   is could be alleviated by streamlining the MDGs and PRSPs into the long-term plan 
and vision of African countries. Moreover, since many African countries remain in conﬂ  ict or post-conﬂ  ict 
situations, both the MDGs and the PRSPs need to take this issue on board to bring about a lasting solution 
for poverty and inequity. Similarly, major donor countries are using such targets as their guide for develop-
ment assistance, but do not seem to address these latter issues (see Weeks and others, 2003; UNDP, 2002).
In addition to the country level harmonization of policies with MDG targets, regional initiatives 
such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) have anchored their framework on MDG 
targets. Th   us, the global as well as regional inertia behind the MDGs is increasingly forming a large part of 
the oﬃ   cial discourse on poverty, equity and interdependence. Th   is is occurring even though the resources 
required to attain the MDGs are so signiﬁ  cant that they render achieving such targets unrealistic. Th  is  is 
further accentuated by the declining ﬂ  ow of oﬃ   cial development assistance to Africa in recent years and the 
rising debt burden in these countries. ECA (1999), for instance, forecasted the required GDP growth rate to 
halve poverty in Africa by 2015, to be about 7.2 per cent (or 4.2 per cent per capita).
Given the problems of domestic resource mobilization, the required level of external ﬁ  nancing is 
estimated at about 26 per cent of GDP. Th   is is well above the current level of oﬃ   cial development assistance 
(ODA) to GDP ratio of about 12 per cent, which shows the diﬃ   culty in achieving the MDGs in Africa (see 
ECA, 1999). It is interesting to note that since the MDGs basically comprise social development goals, failure 
to achieve them is tantamount to regression in social development, equity and poverty reduction. Th  e  impacts 
of initial inequality on eﬃ   cient growth and poverty reduction need serious consideration. Figure 8 illustrates 
how the responsiveness of poverty to growth (elasticity of poverty to growth) varies with initial income in-
equality in SSA. Th  e  ﬁ  gure shows that countries with low levels of income inequality need a much lower rate 
of per capita income growth than those with high initial income inequality to reduce poverty by half by 2015.24  DESA Working Paper No. 25
From the discussion in the preceding sections, it is noted that initial inequality in Africa is strongly 
correlated with the degree of openness of the economy. Th   at said, these countries need rapid and sustained 
growth in order to signiﬁ  cantly impact poverty. In fact, if countries can contain income inequality to its 
existing level, modest growth would be suﬃ   cient to reduce poverty by half by 2015 (see Shimeles, 2004). 
Th   e issue therefore is that each country needs to consider how the interaction of trade reform and income in-
equality aﬀ  ects poverty. Th   e contributions of trade reform to growth however, should not be the only guide 
used to design poverty reduction policies.
Conclusions
It has been more than a decade since world leaders committed themselves to bring about meaningful change 
in social development equity, inequality, and poverty at the Copenhagen Summit. An examination of the 
realization of these commitments shows that almost all African countries are very far from reaching their 
goals. Recently though, there has been a revitalization of economic fundamentals important to improving 
the social sectors. However, cautious optimism is required. Sustainable economic growth and development is 
precarious due to Africa’s patterns of trade and ﬁ  nance, the prevalence of conﬂ  ict, dependence on agriculture 
(the main stay of the majority of the rural population), the vagaries of nature, backward technology, and 
dependence on the global commodity market.
International trade, ﬁ  nance, and aid link Africa to the world and in particular, developed coun-
tries. Th   ese relationships are accentuated by the policy prescriptions of international ﬁ  nancial institutions 
(IFIs), which are in turn, complemented by global commitments like the MDGs and by African govern-
ments themselves. SAPs and PRSPs were intended in part, to speed up African engagement in global markets 
through a set of polices loosely termed ‘liberalization’. Trade liberalization policies were critical instruments 
deployed in African countries during the SAP era, and trade remains the most signiﬁ  cant channel through 
which global interdependence impacts the welfare of ordinary African citizens. Justiﬁ  ably, there is a need 
for in-depth analysis of the patterns and implications of trade liberalization polices on social development, 
inequality, and poverty.
Figure 8:
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Africa is eﬀ  ectively marginalized from global markets given its degree of trade and ﬁ  nancial inte-
gration with the rest of the world. Th   e high growth and investment targets and hence, external ﬁ  nancing 
required to reduce poverty, makes this isolation a curse, especially in light of dwindling levels of domestic 
savings. Yet, its partition can also be considered a blessing because Africa has remained somewhat isolated 
from international ﬁ  nancial market instability.
From a policy perspective, Africa’s integration into the global ﬁ  nancial system requires the institu-
tion of policies that promote investment ﬂ  ows to the continent, but also manage the extreme volatility and 
risks associated with such capital ﬂ  ows. Success in capital market liberalization in Africa requires, among 
other things, stronger ﬁ  nancial sector management and institutions and capacity building. It is also very 
important to confront the policy dilemma and trade-oﬀ  s between high ﬂ  ows and high volatility. Given the 
huge cost of bailing out countries when they are faced with ﬁ  nancial crisis, Bhinda and others (1999) rightly 
noted that “Africa has no ‘big brother’ to facilitate a bailout in the ﬁ  rst place.” Appropriate exchange rate 
policy, debt management, proper ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision, and transparency are all necessary in-
struments for managing capital ﬂ  ows. Many of the preconditions for sustained ﬂ  ows of FDI to Africa rely on 
the structural transformation of African economies. Th   is would have a positive eﬀ  ect on market size, resource 
discovery, and the conditions that enable high levels of growth.
In the face of the declining trend of ODA, aid eﬀ  ectiveness is an increasingly important policy tool, 
the development of which requires speciﬁ  c strategies for boosting capital eﬃ   ciency and transitioning from 
aid dependency in the medium to long run. Aid dependency has long-term detrimental eﬀ  ects on already 
weakened African institutions. Policymaking, thus, needs to insulate institutions through country and 
regional level capacity building strategies that go beyond economic management into issues of governance. 
Finally, addressing the trade related problems discussed at length in this paper will be a major step toward 
alleviating the continent’s ﬁ  nancial problems.
Th   e importance of the world economy to Africa, especially international trade, is signiﬁ  cant.9 
However national governments are required to adjust to ‘economic reality’ and ‘market discipline’ in order 
to stimulate exports and promote foreign investment. Certain dangers are ignored, such as the ‘race to the 
bottom’, as individual countries try to bend their labour standards, environmental safeguards, and tax con-
cessions to boost trade. Policymakers also ignore the ‘fallacy of composition’ inherent in the small-country 
assumption, causing the over-expansion of commodity supplies and declining prices.
Economic perception is as vitally important as economic reality. External economic relations need 
to be examined as a variable, rather than as a given. Domestic economic events become endogenous to the 
operation of the global system rather than simply at the behest of policymakers. Th   is shows, on the one 
hand, how limited the options really are for domestic policymakers in Africa (especially if they act individu-
ally and only for short periods) and, on the other hand, the crucial importance of changing international 
arrangements, particularly trade and investment rules rather than aid. Th   e global market remains extremely 
important to the African economy, especially given Africa’s dependence on trade in a few commodities, the 
dominant eﬀ  ect of trade in the economy, and the secular deterioration and volatility of its terms of trade.
Africa’s entrance into the global system has not been orderly, as can be read from its economic history, 
including the origins of its debt and external ﬁ  nance problems. As previously noted, debt issues stem from the 
structure of trade in general and from commodity trade in particular. Th   e twin eﬀ  ects of low income and low 
9  See Alemayehu (2002) for details on this.26  DESA Working Paper No. 25
price elasticities in developed country markets have led to declining terms of trade and high price volatility. 
Th   e question then seems to be why Africa has not diversiﬁ  ed its exports to manufactures, services, or pro-
cessed raw materials, all of which oﬀ  er better growth prospects. One reason may be that such a switch requires 
capital (infrastructure and plant) and skills (or ‘human capital’) that Africa does not currently possess.
What lessons are relevant for shaping the future of economic growth and development in Africa? 
First, research amply conﬁ  rms that the debt problem is essentially a commodity problem (see Alemayehu, 
2002). Eﬀ  orts such as the HIPC process, which at least indicates a political commitment to act, will have 
little lasting eﬀ  ect unless export capacity and prices are raised. Second, if international ﬂ  ows of capital to 
Africa (such as aid) are envisaged, then more aid should be channelled towards small export farmers to pro-
mote exports and reduce poverty. Aid should also be accompanied by expansionary policies in order to keep 
exchange rates competitive. Th  ird, Africa is highly vulnerable to changes in world interest rates and the sub-
sequent activities of speculators because of their impact on commodity prices (the capital market eﬀ  ect of in-
terest rates changes is not relevant). Th   is implies that the construction of a new ‘global ﬁ  nancial architecture’ 
can only be undertaken at the international level. Fourth, ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits are mostly exogenously determined 
by aid ﬂ  ows. Th   is has important implications in terms of the need for donors to coordinate their actions in 
order to ensure macroeconomic sustainability, rather than leaving this task to IFIs alone (Alemayehu, 2002).
Th   ese various policy implications imply that the trade relations of Africa with developed countries 
need to be strengthened. Th   e question then, is how? Improved access to developed country markets for 
processed primary commodities, and, in particular, the replacement of the Lomé system with better access 
to the European and American markets (along Everything but Arms of the EU and Th   e African Growth and 
Opportunity Act of the US) would be a ﬁ  rst and important step. Commodity price stabilization schemes are 
currently out of favour and would require the full cooperation of the major importing transnational corpora-
tions in order to work at all. However, this is a problem of price volatility around the trend, as well as the 
declining trend itself. Reducing this volatility would beneﬁ  t both importers and exporters and thus should 
not be impossible to achieve through a properly administered buﬀ  er stock system. Th   e market mechanism 
alone cannot produce this result since hedging ranges are so short, so this would have to be a form of public 
intervention. However, the long-term downward direction of the terms of trade is diﬃ   cult. It would not 
matter so much if volume was increasing fast enough to raise the income terms of trade (as is happening 
with labour-intensive manufactures), but this is not, in fact, the case. Th   e market for tropical commodities is 
oligopolistic and riddled with restrictive practices, e.g., sugar and cotton in the US and bananas and coﬀ  ee in 
Europe. Th   erefore, a producers’ cartel may be the only theoretically viable solution. However, in spite of the 
recent success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in driving up oil prices, Africa 
is unlikely to be able to organize such a cartel given the worldwide competition in those commodities.
Africa needs to change the mix (or at the very least upgrade the quality) of its primary export prod-
ucts in order to compete within the foreseeable future. Th   is requires investment, in particular, joint ventures 
with foreign companies, investment by domestic investors, such as ﬁ  rms and households, and the reversal 
of capital ﬂ  ight. More than savings, risk is the main problem, since there is plenty of capital held overseas 
and also plenty of liquidity within the banking system. Th   ese steps cannot be undertaken by each African 
country in isolation but rather, requires an international agreement on investment rules and stabilization of 
commodity prices; in other words, the orderly insertion of Africa into the global market.
Th   is process, the orderly insertion of African in the global market, is not a smooth one, as illus-
trated by the outcome of liberalization policies and the enormous distributional consequences in the short Openness, Inequality and Poverty in Africa  2 7
to medium run. Th   e impact of trade liberalization on household welfare varies considerably from country 
to country, and depending on the circumstances, it could improve social development or exacerbate existing 
poverty and inequality. Destitution and inequality are more likely to worsen in the presence of weak domes-
tic industries and institutions, low degrees of inter-sectoral labour mobility, weak ﬁ  nancial institutions, fre-
quent policy reversals, and the challenging market structure of the tradable and non-tradable sectors. Th  us, 
the design and implementation of trade polices requires taking all of these issues into consideration.
Th   e impact of trade liberalization on welfare depends to a certain degree on the state of income and 
poverty distribution in Africa. Existing income inequality is relatively high in most African countries, which 
makes the distributional consequence of trade policies a serious matter. Cross-country evidence shows the 
positive correlation between trade policies and income inequality through the channel of land abundance 
(e.g. Fischer, 2000), and through political economy factors for Africa (e.g. Easterly, 2002). In some cases, 
trade liberalization could also worsen income distribution by reducing the demand for unskilled labour. A 
related issue is the impact of trade reform on intra-household inequality and gender disparity. Even if the 
aggregate welfare of a household increases, it is possible for some measures of trade reform to increase intra-
household inequality through changes in employment opportunities between male and female household 
members (Winters, 2000) as well as through changes in the composition of the whole workforce (UNDP, 
2003). Sectors such as textiles may rapidly expand in the wake of trade liberalization, which in Africa, are 
mostly female-intensive (Blackden, 2003). Depending on the relative wages in these sectors, overall inequal-
ity tends to rise even if more women are employed in the economy.
Th   e positive eﬀ  ects of trade liberalization can be enhanced if policymakers act at the right time 
(Winters, 2000), and institute basic macroeconomic stability policies (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002). For 
instance, inﬂ  ationary trade policy measures can be controlled with appropriate macro-stabilization policies. 
Th   ese stabilization policies though, in most cases hurt the poor. Th   us, it is important to decide the appro-
priate timing of the trade reform in order to maximize gains and minimize the adverse eﬀ  ects on the least 
well-oﬀ  .
Integrating poverty diagnostics with trade policies can minimize the negative eﬀ  ects. Poverty map-
ping assists in development of trade reforms that beneﬁ  t the poor or minimize their welfare loss. Poverty 
decomposition along sectoral lines also provides analytical tools to evaluate who beneﬁ  ts from trade liberal-
ization, thus helping policymakers devise the most appropriate and eﬀ  ective intervention strategies on behalf 
of the poor (Kanbur, 2000).
Finally, ownership of policies, such as PRSPs, is crucial. In order to realize the ideals of the Social 
Summit, strategies must be designed in a way that ensures the sustainability of recent gains in the macroeco-
nomic sphere and their integration with social objectives. Th   is will take the form of:
Ensuring political stability and designing peaceful mechanisms of conﬂ  ict resolution
Pursuing macroeconomic stability by emphasizing the savings–investment-export nexus, and 
policy ownership
Investing in human capital formation and institution building
Addressing each country’s major structural problems such as diversiﬁ  cation and dependency
Progress on each of these fronts is a way to bring about social development equity, poverty reduction, and 
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World 15 26 41 59 16 20 36 64
Low & Middle Income 
Economies 30 53 83 17 37 35 72 28
SSA 34 58 92 8 37 46 83 17
East Asia & Paciﬁ  c 1 75 87 52 52 24 56 73 3
South Asia 6 57 63 37 9 44 53 47
Middle East & N. Africa ---- 7 4 1 8 9 28
Latin America & 
Caribbean 43 50 93 7 43 45 88 12
 1980 1990
World 17 18 35 65 17 9 26 74
Low & Middle Income 
Economies 38 30 68 32 25 21 46 54
SSA 36 52 88 12 35 45 80 20
East Asia & Paciﬁ  c 2 33 25 54 51 22 03 26 8
South Asia 8 38 46 54 6 23 29 71
Middle East & N. Africa 91 3 94 6 82 3 85 15
Latin America & 
Caribbean 43 37 80 20 3 63 66 34
 2001
World 10 12 22 78
Low & Middle Income 
Economies 25 15 40 60
SSA 39 28 67 33
East Asia & Paciﬁ  c 9 11 20 80
South Asia 6 16 22 78
Middle East & N. Africa 82 4 86 14
Latin America & 
Caribbean 25 26 51 49
Source: Based on World Bank, World Development Report, various issues.
Notes: Other primary commodities include Food and Agricultural raw materials. Where, Food- comprises the commodities in SITC 
sections 0 (food and live animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco), and 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats) and SITC division 22 
(oil seeds, oil nuts, and oil kernels); Agricultural raw materials- comprises SITC section 2 (crude materials except fuels) excluding 
division 22, 27 (crude fertilizer and minerals excluding coal petroleum, and precious stones), and 28 (metalliferous ores and scrap) 
(World Bank (2003d).
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Annex 1b.
Export share of total exports of three principal commodities in SSA countries 
Countries 1970 1990-1992 1997-1999 Three leading commodities in 1997-1999
Angola 62.80 96.3 71.0 Fuel, diamond sorted, coffee
Benin 59.90 25.4 37.9 Cotton lint, cotton seed, oil of palm
Botswana n.a. 78.8 73.2 Diamonds sorted, bovine meat, hides and skin
Burkina Faso n.a. 50.3 41.5 Cotton lint, sesame seed, hides and skin
Burundi 94.70 86.3 88.9 Coffee, tea, sugar
Cameroon n.a. 74.3 44.1 Fuels, wood non-coniferous, cocoa
Cent. African Rep. 74.30 64.5 73.2 Diamonds sorted, coffee, wood non-coniferous
Chad 90.80 68.0 52.4 Cotton lint, live animals, crude materials (inc. ﬂ  owers)
Congo 67.40 94.5 85.8 Fuels, wood non-coniferous, sugar
Cote d’Ivoire 77.30 50.7 60.0 Cocoa, fuel, coffee
DR Congo (ex-Zaire) n.a. 86.6 86.3 Diamond sorted, coffee, wood non-coniferous
Djibouti n.a. 1.6 7.2 Sugar, crude materials, ﬁ  shery commodities
Equatorial Guinea 90.44* 62.5 89.1 Fuel, wood non-coniferous, cocoa
Ethiopia 79.50 74.1 79.4 Coffee, hides and skins, sesame seeds
Gabon 82.90 93.2 93.2 Fuels, wood non-coniferous, Manganese ore
Gambia 98.90 25.6 19.0 Ground nuts, ﬁ  shery commodities, oils of ground nuts
Ghana 88.30 69.2 61.9 Cocoa, diamond sorted, gold
Guinea n.a. 61.6 59.9 Bauxite, alumina, ﬁ  shery commodities
Guinea-Bissau 83.47** 81.6 75.2 Nuts, ﬁ  shery commodities, cotton lint
Kenya 60.50 49.6 46.1 Tea, coffee, fuels
Lesotho 73.00 9.9 3.0 Wool, greasy, food wastes
Liberia 90.60 35.9 14.6 Natural rubber, wood non-coniferous, fuels
Madagascar 57.10 33.4 54.2 Fishery commodities, hides and skins
Malawi 79.50 86.5 71.0 Tobacco, tea, sugar
Mali 65.10 73.3 45.1 Cotton lint, live animals, oils of ground nuts
Mauritania 96.50 75.6 72.4 Iron ore and concentrates, ﬁ  shery commodities, fuel
Mauritius 97.20 30.6 23.3 Sugar, ﬁ  shery commodities, crude materials
Mozambique 36.70 54.5 42.9 Fishery commodities, nuts, wood non-coniferous
Namibia n.a. 28.7 72.1 Diamond sorted, ﬁ  shery commodities, live animals
Niger 30.00 95.7 93.7 Uranium, live animals, tobacco
Nigeria 83.50 95.0 78.2 Fuels, cocoa, natural rubber
Rwanda 93.40 85.6 69.6 Coffee, tea, hides and skins
Senegal 53.70 56.8 41.7 Fishery commodities, fuel, oils of ground nuts
Seychelles 53.00 81.2 35.0 Fishery commodities, fuels, cinnamon
Sierra Leone 52.20 17.0 26.6 Fishery commodities, coffee, cocoa
Somalia 87.60 56.1 41.2 Live animals, banana, ﬁ  shery commodities
Sudan 87.80 27.6 28.7 Sesame seed, crude materials (incl. Flowers), coarse grain
Swaziland n.a. 28.6 23.2 Sugar, fruits prepared , other citrus fruits
Tanzania 43.90 66.9 47.5 Fuels, tobacco, sugar
Togo 83.80 66.1 61.8 Na. Ca. phosphate, cotton lint, coffee
Uganda 86.90 65.8 65.9 Coffee, ﬁ  shery commodities, crude materials (incl. ﬂ  ower)
Zambia 97.10 77.2 49.6 Reﬁ  ned copper, sugar, cotton lint
Zimbabwe n.a. 40.7 32.8 Tobacco, cotton lint, gold
Sub-Saharan Africa 74.6 68.5  
Source: UNCTAD (1979); UNCTAD (2003), Commodity Yearbook, except for SSA, which is World Bank (2002), World 
Development Indicators, CD Database.
* Two  commodities.
** One  commodity.